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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade a host of major bilateral and multilateral donors, international 
organisations, non-governmental organisations and academic experts on corruption have 
advocated an integrated, comprehensive approach to fighting corruption around the globe.
1  
Typically, there are three key aspects of such an approach: introducing new or amended 
legislation aimed at reducing public officials’ opportunities for rent-seeking in those areas 
most prone to corrupt practices, such as political party finance, the civil service, money-
laundering and financial regulation; building alliances with other governments in the struggle 
against corruption by signing international anti-corruption covenants and participating in 
transnational organisations committed to fighting corruption; and the implementation of an 
omnibus anti-corruption programme.  These omnibus anti-corruption programmes generally 
entail some combination of the following: a concept document, an anti-corruption law, a 
dedicated agency or inter-ministerial commission, an action plan to implement the programme, 
and a monitoring mechanism. 
The justification for encouraging countries to adopt these comprehensive anti-corruption 
programmes has been not only to develop an integrated framework for policy and institutional 
reforms, but also to launch a process whereby key stakeholders – both domestic and 
international – can build a consensus on a strategy for fighting corruption and hold 
governments accountable for implementing that strategy.  For governments, a strong part of 
the appeal of such programmes has been the signal that they are intended to send to domestic 
and foreign audiences that the government is committed to getting tough on corruption.  Anti-
corruption programmes are thus supposed to build momentum for change across a wide range 
of constituencies, to demonstrate the government’s commitment to change and to serve as a 
benchmark for measuring the government’s success in the long-term struggle to reduce the 
incidence and impact of corruption. 
Numerous developing and transition countries have adopted various combinations of these 
three types of anti-corruption programmes, often with the technical and financial support of 
the multilateral donor agencies.  However, despite the proliferation of anti-corruption 
programmes around the world, there has been little systematic research into their impact as a 
signal of the government’s commitment to anti-corruption efforts or, more importantly, their 
effectiveness in reducing corruption.  The increased attention to governance and corruption by 
development institutions and donor agencies in the past ten years has spawned numerous 
diagnostic studies of the causes of corruption and led to the creation of various corruption and 
governance indicators.
2  While this is a welcome development, it has not necessarily brought 
us much closer to understanding the causes of corruption, much less the effectiveness of 
alternative measures used to combat it. 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Charlick (1993), Clarke (1983), Doig (1995), Findlay and Stewart (1992), Harsch 
(1993), IRIS (1996), Klitgaard (1988), Langseth and Stapenhurst (1997), Larrea-Santos (1997), New 
South Wales Independent Commission against Corruption (1999), Pope (2000), Riley (1993, 1998), 
Theobald et al. (2002), United Nations Development Programme (1998), World Bank (1997a, 1997b, 
2000). 
2  For example, the most high profile of these include Transparency International’s “Bribe Payers 
Index” and “Corruption Perceptions Index,” available at www.transparency.org/surveys/index;  the 
World Bank’s “Governance Indicators,” available at www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/data; the 
Heritage Foundation’s “Index of Economic Freedom,” at www.heritage.org/research/features/index; 
and the World Economic Forum’s “Global Competitiveness Report,” at www.weforum.org/gcr.   2
In many transition countries, the development and implementation of anti-corruption 
programmes are still at an early stage.  But because these programmes have become the focal 
point of anti-corruption efforts in many countries of the region, it is important to continually 
assess their impact on different dimensions of corruption and to adjust these strategies 
accordingly. Anti-corruption programmes that prove ineffective in achieving demonstrable 
results in a reasonable time frame or, in the worst case, that serve as a rhetorical cover for 
government inaction undermine public confidence in all future government anti-corruption 
efforts. Consequently, frequent tracking of the progress and performance of anti-corruption 
programmes is critical. 
This paper analyses the effectiveness of the anti-corruption activities of 24 of the 27 transition 
countries, dividing them into three groups: omnibus anti-corruption programmes, legislative 
measures to strengthen institutions of governance and accountability, and adherence to 
international anti-corruption conventions.
3   The central questions the paper addresses are: 
Have these three types of anti-corruption programmes been associated with reductions in the 
levels of administrative corruption and state capture in the period 1999-2002?
4  What types of 
anti-corruption programmes have been most closely associated with reductions in levels of 
both administrative and grand corruption? 
The paper is outlined as follows: in Section 1, we review the existing literature on the 
effectiveness of anti-corruption programmes and outline the methodology employed in this 
paper to make a preliminary judgment about the effectiveness of omnibus programmes, new 
anti-corruption legislation and participation in international anti-corruption conventions.  We 
then provide a detailed explanation of the indices of anti-corruption programmes and describe 
the variable weighting used to construct the anti-corruption index.  In Section 2, we describe 
the patterns in anti-corruption programming across the transition countries, and in the 
following section we provide tentative explanations of the observed variations in the design 
and implementation of anti-corruption strategies across the transition countries.  In Section 4, 
we describe the correlations between the various types of anti-corruption programmes and 
changes in our measures of the ‘objective’ levels of corruption, and propose some tentative 
explanations for these observed variations.  This leads us, in Section 5, to describe and 
attempt to explain the correlations between the levels of anti-corruption programming and 
changes in the perception of corruption in the transition countries.  We conclude in Section 6 
with a summary of the policy implications of these early, and still tentative, findings.   
Throughout the paper we draw on empirical examples from specific transition countries’ 
experiences with anti-corruption programmes, and provide three short country case studies in 
Annex 1. 
This paper does not reach any firm conclusions on the impact of national anti-corruption 
programmes in the transition countries.  Because we only have data on corruption from 1999 
and 2002, the paper is limited to the role of anti-corruption programmes in this period.   
Naturally, anti-corruption initiatives launched prior to 1999 could be expected to influence 
corruption trends in the 1999-2002 period, especially as anti-corruption programmes are 
understood to be medium- to long-term rather than quick fix solutions.  However, this 
problem is partially offset by the fact that most anti-corruption programmes that have been 
introduced since the onset of transition have been developed only in the last few years.   
                                                 
3   Tajikistan and Serbia and Montenegro were excluded from the 1999 BEEPS sample, and 
Turkmenistan from the 2002 BEEPS sample.  These countries are therefore excluded from our 
analysis (with the exceptions of Table 1 and Chart 1, which have been included for information but do 
not form part of the substantive analysis in the paper).  
4  “State capture” refers to the “capture” of the state by private firms or individuals, i.e., the 
establishment of conditions of undue influence over the institutions of the state by private entities in 
order to serve the private interests of those entities at the expense of the broader polity.  See Hellman 
(1998).   3
Moreover, the credibility of even long-term anti-corruption programmes often depends on 
defining manageable short-term benchmarks to demonstrate progress and build the 
government’s support in this area.  Our goal in this paper is to identify key trends in anti-
corruption efforts in the transition countries and to relate them to observed changes in both 
perceptions of corruption and reported levels of bribery and payments to secure influence 
over agents of the state. 
   4
1. ASSESSING  THE  VALUE-ADDED OF ANTI-CORRUPTION 
PROGRAMMES 
Drawing from international experience beyond the post-communist transition countries, there 
are several examples where anti-corruption programmes of the type described above have 
worked effectively.  The anti-corruption agencies in Hong Kong, Singapore and Botswana are 
often cited as models in which independent bodies with firm political backing and oversight 
by the legislature were able to root out corruption at the highest level of government.
5  
However, applications of this model in other regions have had mixed results: for example, this 
approach has had far less success in countries where corruption problems were of a more 
systemic nature.
6 
In fact, previous studies have suggested that anti-corruption agencies, ombudsman offices and 
similar institutions work best where they are needed least – that is, in countries where initial 
levels of corruption are less severe.
7  In countries where corruption is endemic, the effect of 
these same institutions has generally been either neutral or, in some cases, counterproductive 
when the agency itself becomes discredited, further deepening public scepticism about the 
government’s anti-corruption efforts.  It has proven difficult to build anti-corruption 
institutions which operate independently from the weak governance structures that 
characterise countries with systemic corruption, including the legal system, mechanisms of 
political accountability and financial and regulatory institutions.  Anti-corruption 
commissions, ombudsman offices and ethics codes have rarely functioned effectively in these 
environments without substantial government actions to make corresponding changes in the 
broader institutional context.  Whether the development of a national anti-corruption 
programme with a comprehensive strategy, action plan and independent commission is more 
likely to enhance the government’s commitment to a multi-pronged reform agenda has not 
been studied systematically with evidence from existing anti-corruption programmes. 
To measure the effectiveness of these alternative forms of anti-corruption activity, we use 
data from the EBRD/World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys 
(BEEPS), conducted in 1999 and 2002. These data provide important insights into the 
dynamics of corruption in the region.  The two rounds of the BEEPS asked a large sample of 
firms in 24 transition countries a series of questions about the nature and effects of corruption 
on their business and the country’s business climate.  The changes in firms’ responses in the 
three year period between these two rounds allow us to estimate changes in the overall level 
of corruption in these countries over this period.
8 
The structure and results of the two rounds of the BEEPS have been described at length.
9  In 
brief, the two surveys found that the levels of both state capture and administrative corruption 
varied significantly across the region.  By and large, the countries of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) were subject to higher levels of both aspects of corruption than 
south-eastern European (SEE) and central and eastern European and Baltic (CEB) countries.  
The surveys also found that there is a strong association between the level of corruption and 
                                                 
5 See Quah (1982, 1989), de Speville (1995), Doig and Riley (1998), Frimpong (1997), Tan (1995). 
6 See Pope (1999). 
7 See Huther and Shah (2000). 
8 While all survey-based measures of corruption are inherently perceptions based, and therefore the 
results of the two BEEPS rounds will to a certain extent reflect changes in perceptions of corruption 
rather than any objective measure of corruption, the surveys attempted to minimise the impact of 
perceptions by asking questions specifically about levels of bribes.  In addition respondents were 
asked about their perceptions of corruption as an obstacle to the operation and growth of their 
businesses.  We examine both of these measurements in this paper.  See below for further detail. 
9 See EBRD (1999, 2002), and World Bank (2000, 2003).   5
the degree of obstacles to the operation and growth of businesses.  In addition, the surveys 
found that state capture significantly boosts the investment and real revenue growth rates of 
firms that engage in this activity, but holds back the growth performance of other firms.  
Finally, the second round of the BEEPS found that in virtually all transition economies the 
business environment improved significantly between 1999 and 2002.
10 
In order to classify anti-corruption activity, we surveyed initiatives that have been put in place 
in all countries between the first and second BEEPS rounds, and coded them in a matrix of 
anti-corruption activity.  These activities are divided into the three broad categories outlined 
above: omnibus reform programmes, new legislation targeted at anti-corruption, and 
accession to international covenants and membership in international anti-corruption 
coalitions.  In each area, a scoring system has been developed to serve as the basis of an index 
that can be used to compare the extent of anti-corruption activities across countries. 
In the area of omnibus activities, we examine whether any of the following initiatives have 
been undertaken: (1) the design and publication of an anti-corruption strategy; (2) the 
development of an implementing anti-corruption action plan; and (3) the establishment of a 
national anti-corruption commission, ombudsman or similar authority.  For each of these three 
initiatives each country in the matrix was coded ‘1’ if it had introduced the anti-corruption 
measures and a ‘0’ if it had not.  These three major components of the omnibus anti-
corruption index are all weighted equally in the omnibus index, as outlined in Table 1. 
 
                                                 
10 For a more detailed synopsis of these findings and a more explicit argument about how corruption 
affects firm performance, see Fries et al. (2003).   6
 
Of course, drafting strategies and creating commissions need not necessarily indicate serious 
efforts to combat corruption and, indeed, could even serve as a smokescreen for inaction. 
Therefore, the index requires some measure of the government’s commitment to these 
initiatives.  Some crude indicators of government commitment include: (1) whether non-
governmental organisations are included in the development of the anti-corruption 
Table 1: Anti-corruption matrix variables and weighting 
 
  Percentage of Intensity Index 
   
Intensity Index  100.0 
of which:   
Omnibus Index  33.3 
National anti-corruption strategy  11.1   
  Adopted  5.56   
  Involved NGOS  2.78   
  Multi-branch  2.78   
Anti-corruption action plan  11.1   
  Adopted  5.56   
  Involved NGOS  2.78   
  Multi-branch  2.78   
Anti-corruption commission or ombudsman  11.1   
  Established  5.56   
  Involved NGOS  1.11   
  Multi-branch  1.11   
  Independent  3.33   
    
Legal Index  33.3 
Civil Service Law  5.56   
Financial Disclosure Law  5.56   
Public Procurement Law  5.56   
Freedom of Information Law  5.56   
Party Finance Law  5.56   
Anti-Money Laundering Law  5.56   
    
Conventions Index*  33.3 
Stability Pact Anti-Corruption Initiative*  5.56   
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention  5.56   
COE GRECO  5.56   
COE Convention on Laundering, Search,  Seizure and 
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime  5.56   
COE Criminal Law Convention on Corruption  5.56   
COE Civil Law Convention on Corruption  5.56   
* In the non-Stability Pact countries, the other five indicators in this Index represent 6.67 per 
cent of the Intensity Index.   7
strategy/action plan and in the operation of the anti-corruption commission; (2) whether 
multiple government branches or ministries, i.e., the judiciary, law enforcement, and various 
government ministries, were involved in the elaboration and implementation of these 
programmes; and (3) whether the anti-corruption commission is granted formal independence 
from the government.  These aspects of each of the three ‘core’ omnibus anti-corruption 
measures are also coded ‘1’ and ‘0,’ while the weighting of the combined sub-components 
equals that of the core measures, as detailed in Table 1. 
In terms of new anti-corruption legislation, we have developed an index based on the 
implementation of, or amendments to, six key laws: (1) a civil service law; (2) a financial 
disclosure law, which regulates both public officials and private investors; (3) a public 
procurement law; (4) a freedom of information law; (5) a political party financing law; and 
(6) an anti-money laundering law.
11   Although introducing other forms of anti-corruption 
legislation is without doubt also significant in terms of reducing corruption, these six areas 
have been chosen because they are areas in which the transition countries typically did not 
have effective legislation in place at the start of transition and in which the regulatory 
framework during the first half of the 1990s typically remained weak.  These key legislative 
reforms have thus consistently been highlighted by bodies such as the OECD, international 
financial institutions, and domestic and international non-governmental organisations as the 
areas most likely to reduce the incentives and opportunities for both administrative corruption 
and state capture.  Each of these six legislative reforms are weighted equally: the introduction 
or amendment of each of these six laws during the 1999-2002 period would generate a score 
on the legal index of 100 per cent, in three of these areas 50 per cent, and so on.  We call this 
the ‘legal index’ for short. 
Finally, in order to assess the transition countries’ commitment to international anti-
corruption conventions and standards, we created an index measuring whether countries are 
signatories to and have ratified the Stability Pact Anti-Corruption Initiative (SPAI), the 
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, the Council of Europe’s (COE) Criminal and Civil Law 
Conventions on Corruption, the COE’s Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and 
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime, and the COE’s Group of States against Corruption 
(GRECO).
12  As with the legal index, membership in or signing of each of these international 
instruments is weighted equally.  Those countries that are not eligible for any one of these 
instruments, for example the SPAI, were assessed on their participation in the others alone.  
To further refine this index, on each of the conventions for which countries were eligible, 
countries were given 1/3 for signing the instrument, 2/3 for signing and ratifying, and a ‘1’ if 
the convention had been signed, ratified by the legislature, and had entered into force both 
domestically and within the context of the international organisation which sponsored it.
13 
By aggregating these three component indicators, we create an overall index measuring the 
extent of anti-corruption activities in the transition countries, which we call the ‘intensity of 
anti-corruption index.’  The intensity index is weighted evenly on the omnibus, legal and 
international conventions indices. 
In the section that follows we describe the patterns in anti-corruption programming across the 
27 transition countries, before going on to make a preliminary assessment of the effectiveness 
of omnibus programmes, new anti-corruption legislation and participation in international 
conventions in changing both perceptions and actual levels of corruption. 
                                                 
11 On the importance of freedom of information for general good governance, see Islam (2003). 
12 Countries were only scored on membership in the organisations or conventions for which they are 
eligible. 
13 The highest score any country could receive on the COE’s Civil Law Convention on Corruption was 
2/3, as the Convention has not yet received sufficient signatories to enter into force.   8
2. ANTI-CORRUPTION  PROGRAMMES IN THE TRANSITION 
 COUNTRIES 
What types of patterns are evident in anti-corruption activities across the transition countries?  
Table 2 summarises the transition countries’ scores on the intensity and three component anti-
corruption indices, which range from ’0’ (no explicit anti-corruption programmes) to ’1’ 
(substantial anti-corruption programmes).  The full country results are reported in Annex 2.  
As Table 2 shows, 26 of the 27 transition countries, with the exception of Turkmenistan, have 
undertaken some form of anti-corruption activity in at least one of the three areas outlined 
above.  Indeed, 16 of the 27 countries have undertaken activity in all three of the categories 
and all countries – except Belarus and Turkmenistan – have implemented new anti-corruption 
legislation which addresses the issue of corruption.  However, as Table 2 illustrates, there is a 
great deal of variation across countries both on the intensity index, as well as variation within 
countries across the three component indices. 
Some caveats are necessary at this stage.  These indicators are designed to assess formal 
measures to combat corruption.  Most of these measures are strongly recommended by 
multilateral and bilateral donors and other international agencies, which use them to indicate 
government commitment to anti-corruption efforts.  As a result, there are both international 
and domestic pressures to adopt such measures.  However, the gaps between formal measures, 
government commitment and government capacity to implement these measures can be 
substantial.  While the scores on these indicators are a useful, if crude, measure of the extent 
of explicit, formal anti-corruption measures, they should not be mistaken for indicators of the 
government’s actual commitment to these measures or their effective implementation. 
Moreover, not all measures to combat corruption will be captured by these indicators of 
explicit anti-corruption activities.  There is a very wide range of reforms to enhance the 
investment climate, improve public service delivery, and strengthen public administration and 
financial management. While these reforms address the core problems underlying corruption, 
they might not be incorporated within a broader anti-corruption programme or agency.  The 
impact of this broader menu of governance reforms on reducing levels of corruption has been 
discussed elsewhere.
14  We focus here on explicit anti-corruption activities, not because they 
are more important than governance reforms or a necessary supplement to such reforms, but 
because these activities have in fact proliferated across the region, whether motivated by 
external or internal pressures.  Consequently, there is a genuine need to assess their impact to 
date. 
 
                                                 
14 See World Bank (2003).   9
 














Albania  0.837  0.900  0.833  0.778  0.061 
Armenia 0.189  0.000 0.500  0.067  0.271 
Azerbaijan  0.244  0.167  0.500  0.067  0.227 
Belarus 0.022  0.000  0.000  0.067  0.038 
Bosnia & Herz.  0.343  0.167  0.250  0.611  0.236 
Bulgaria 0.704  0.667 0.667  0.778  0.064 
Croatia  0.752  0.867  0.667  0.722  0.103 
Czech Rep.  0.602  0.417 0.667  0.722  0.163 
Estonia  0.578  0.000  1.000  0.733  0.518 
FYR Macedonia  0.370  0.000 0.333  0.778  0.390 
Georgia  0.383  0.417  0.333  0.400  0.044 
Hungary 0.630  0.333 0.833  0.722  0.263 
Kazakhstan  0.111  0.167  0.167  0.000  0.096 
Kyrgyz Rep.  0.111  0.000 0.333  0.000  0.192 
Latvia  0.700  0.667  0.833  0.600  0.120 
Lithuania 0.900  0.967 1.000  0.733  0.145 
Moldova  0.559  0.567  0.500  0.611  0.056 
Poland 0.593  0.000  1.000 0.778  0.525 
Romania  0.759  0.833  0.667  0.778  0.085 
Russia 0.200  0.000  0.333 0.267  0.176 
Serbia & Mont.  0.467  0.817  0.250  0.333  0.306 
Slovak Rep.  0.907  1.000 1.000  0.722  0.160 
Slovenia  0.641  0.200  1.000  0.722  0.406 
Tajikistan 0.056  0.000 0.167  0.000  0.096 
Turkmenistan  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Ukraine 0.389  0.500 0.333  0.333  0.096 
Uzbekistan  0.056  0.000  0.167  0.000  0.096 
CEB  0.700 0.494  0.889 0.717  0.198 
SEE  0.580  0.564  0.500  0.676  0.089 
CIS  0.193 0.151  0.278 0.151  0.073 
Average All  0.448  0.357  0.531  0.456  0.087   10
As one might expect, the advanced transition countries in CEB score higher than the countries 
of SEE and the CIS on the intensity index (see Chart 1).
15  Indeed, both CEB and SEE have 
undertaken a great deal more anti-corruption programming in all three areas than have the 
countries of the CIS, although it must be noted that there is a great deal of variation within 
each of the regional groups.  However, a striking feature of the anti-corruption programming 
in the transition countries is that the south-eastern European countries have undertaken more 
omnibus initiatives than the advanced transition countries of CEB, while the countries of CEB 
score much higher on the legal index than SEE.  Estonia, Slovenia and Poland, for example, 
score among the highest countries on the legal index but have implemented very little 
omnibus anti-corruption programming. 
 





















In SEE, by contrast, countries such as Romania, Bulgaria and, most remarkably, Serbia and 
Montenegro have been very active in the area of omnibus anti-corruption initiatives, while 
their legislative anti-corruption initiatives lag behind in the intermediate to low range.  This 
can be explained, at least in part, by the perception of far higher levels of corruption in the 
south-eastern European countries, and pressures under the Stability Pact and from other 
international bodies to make visible efforts to tackle widespread corruption.  In contrast, in 
CEB in 1999, corruption was generally believed to be a less acute problem than in SEE, and 
the main outstanding legal and institutional issues for meeting the European Union’s acquis 
                                                 
15 The countries of central and eastern Europe and the Baltic states (CEB) include Croatia, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia.  South-
eastern Europe (SEE) includes Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, FYR Macedonia, Romania 
and Serbia and Montenegro.  The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) includes Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.   11
communautaire were better addressed through specific anti-corruption legislative measures 
than through high profile anti-corruption campaigns. 
The overall intensity index divides into four rough groups: the high intensity reformers 
include the Baltic states of Lithuania and Latvia, as well as the Slovak Republic, Albania, 
Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania.  These countries are characterised by high scores across all 
three indices, although of the seven Lithuania and the Slovak Republic score particularly high 
on the omnibus index.  The next group of medium-high intensity anti-corruption countries 
includes most of the accession countries – the Czech Republic, Poland, Estonia, Slovenia and 
Hungary, as well as Moldova, and Serbia and Montenegro.  These countries are characterised 
by relatively high scores on the legal and conventions indices and average scores on omnibus 
activities.  The exceptions include Serbia and Montenegro, which scores high on new 
legislative reforms and low on the conventions index, and Poland and Estonia, which both 
score ‘0’ on the omnibus index and ‘1’ on the legal index.  The medium-low reform group 
includes the three Caucasian states – Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan – as well as Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, Ukraine and Russia.  The countries in this group tend to 
score low on omnibus reforms and closer to average on the legal and conventions indices.  
Finally, the low reform group of countries includes Belarus and the five Central Asian 
countries.  The low anti-corruption intensity countries tend to score higher on the legal index 
than on the omnibus or conventions indices, although they generally tend to be amongst the 
lowest scoring countries on all of the three component indices. 
On the conventions index, CEB and SEE are again quite close together, and both score almost 
five times as high as the CIS.  Thus, Albania, Bulgaria, FYR Macedonia, Romania and Poland 
top the conventions index followed very closely by all of the remaining SEE and CEB 
countries.  The countries of the CIS are much lower down the scale, with Moldova the only 
country scoring more than 40 per cent – largely a result of Moldova’s membership in the 
Stability Pact.  In the remainder of the CIS, only Georgia, Russia and Ukraine have made any 
significant international commitments to combating corruption.  The maps below demonstrate 
graphically the extent of regional variation across the omnibus, legal and conventions indices. 
   12
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As these maps illustrate, the design and implementation of anti-corruption strategies are by no 
means uniform across all of the transition countries.  In the following sections, we attempt to 
explain at least some of this observed variation in the design and implementation of anti-
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3. INITIAL  CONDITIONS  AND THE ADOPTION OF ANTI-
CORRUPTION PROGRAMMES 
Do countries with more significant governance challenges adopt more extensive anti-
corruption programmes?  Chart 2 plots the transition countries according to their level of 
administrative and grand corruption as measured by the 1999 BEEPS, and highlights those 
countries that score highly on the anti-corruption intensity index.
16   In order to measure 
administrative corruption, we use the level of the ‘bribe tax,’ which is the country average of 
the percentage of annual sales that firms pay in bribes to state officials.  The ‘state capture 
index’ is the unweighted average of countries’ scores on six components of state capture, 
including firms’ influence over the government, parliament, criminal and commercial courts, 
central bank and political parties.
17   This chart clearly illustrates that virtually all of the 
transition countries which have pursued intensive anti-corruption programmes over the past 
three years were countries with below-average levels of administrative corruption in 1999.  In 
other words, transition countries with high levels of administrative corruption in 1999 were 
significantly less likely to have embraced wide-ranging anti-corruption activity in the 1999-
2002 period. 
 










































Countries in BOLD score high on the anticorruption intensity index
 
                                                 
16 The lines transecting Chart 2 are drawn at the cross-country mean of each variable. 
17 We use the bribe tax as our ‘headline’ measurement of administrative corruption because it most 
effectively captures the financial impact of administrative corruption on firms.  Moreover, the bribe 
tax seems to be the indicator of actual levels of corruption which are least likely to be influenced by 
firms’ perceptions of the role of the state, the general macroeconomic situation, prospects for future 
growth macroeconomic growth, their own firm’s growth and growth prospects, etc.  We use the state 
capture index as the headline indicator for state capture as it is the average of the six state capture 
variables in the BEEPS.   15
Why does the intensity of anti-corruption programming vary according to the level of 
administrative corruption?  In other words, why were countries which had low levels of 
administrative corruption in 1999 so much more likely to adopt anti-corruption programmes, 
independently of their level of state capture? 
States with low levels of administrative corruption would seem to be more able to use the 
resources of the state to address the problem of administrative corruption. This is precisely 
because these institutions are not permeated by the pervasive corruption of administrative 
structures which, in countries with high levels of administrative corruption, are able to block 
anti-corruption reform programmes.  This echoes the findings of Huther and Shah (2000) that 
anti-corruption programmes work best in countries with low levels of corruption in the first 
place.  Not only do anti-corruption programmes work most effectively in these countries, they 
are also more likely to be adopted in them. 
Transecting Chart 2 along the x-axis (the mean of the state capture index) reveals another 
significant pattern worth noting: more than half of the countries that have undertaken high 
levels of anti-corruption activity in the past four years were countries characterised by low 
capture and low administrative corruption at the time of the last BEEPS in 1999.  Hungary, 
Slovenia, Lithuania, Poland and Estonia were all placed in the low administrative corruption, 
low state capture category in 1999, and yet have been amongst the more active countries in 
introducing anti-corruption programmes.
18 
Of the twelve countries that had medium to high levels of state capture in 1999, only five 
have adopted intensive anti-corruption programmes.  Interestingly, all of these are countries 
that had low to medium levels of administrative corruption as measured by the bribe tax – 
none of the countries with medium-high administrative corruption and medium-high state 
capture are high-intensity anti-corruption countries.  Chart 2 shows that low capture countries 
are just as likely as high-capture countries to adopt intensive anti-corruption programmes.  
Problems of systemic corruption alone do not appear to generate sufficient demand from 
below for specific anti-corruption initiatives.  Rather, the common thread across countries 
with high-intensity anti-corruption programmes is not their corruption profile in 1999, but 
their geographic location – they are all CEB or SEE countries which are present or future EU 
accession candidates. 
It is no accident that the majority of high intensity anti-corruption countries have been 
European Union (EU) accession candidates.  Anti-corruption strategies in the transition 
countries tend to mirror domestic political institutions of power and the type of influence 
applied by international agencies on these countries.  In the accession countries, for example, 
the concerns of the European Commission have been paramount in the crafting of anti-
corruption policies, and the Commission has provided extensive assistance for the 
development of anti-corruption policy, in particular in the formulation of national anti-
corruption strategies and action plans. 
A good example is Lithuania.  Although administrative corruption and state capture were 
deemed to be relatively low in Lithuania in comparison with other transition countries, there 
was nevertheless a broad consensus across political parties, government departments and the 
wider electorate that corruption issues had to be tackled urgently.  The design of anti-
corruption policy, therefore, has been comprehensive in both its approach and implementation.  
It began with a series of diagnostic surveys: in addition to the 1999 BEEPS, the EU’s PHARE 
conducted a comprehensive survey in 1999, which concluded that one-third of ordinary 
citizens and one-half of businessmen in Lithuania had experienced corruption or bribery, and 
                                                 
18 However, corruption levels had been rising in the Czech Republic from 1999 to 2002, according to 
perceptions-based indices such as Transparency International’s “Corruption Perceptions Index.”   16
which recommended the development of a corruption prevention strategy.  In 2001, 
Transparency International Lithuania produced the Map of Corruption in Lithuania: 2001, 
which likewise found that a relatively large proportion of Lithuanians believed corruption to 
be a large and growing problem. 
In response to these and other surveys conducted by international and local NGOs and donor 
organisations, the government in 2000 began drafting a comprehensive National Anti-
corruption Programme.  The first pillar – the National Anti-Corruption Strategy – was put in 
place in the autumn of 2001, followed in January 2002 by the National Anti-Corruption 
Programme.  The latter included the Action Plan for the implementation of the Strategy and 
included specific, targeted laws and policies including revised laws on political party funding, 
conflict of interest regulations for MPs, a Code of Ethics for lobbyists, as well as measures 
designed to improve administrative structures by reducing and capping the number of political 
appointments in the civil service and by developing ministry-specific anti-corruption 
programmes, including training in anti-corruption for all civil servants.  The Programme set 
out clear deadlines for the implementation of these measures and assigned responsibility for 
their achievement to specific government departments and specialised agencies. 
Thus, Lithuania’s anti-corruption strategy and action plan were planned, targeted, 
comprehensive, and designed to address the country-specific problems highlighted by a series 
of diagnostic surveys.  Moreover, anti-corruption programmes in Lithuania were specifically 
designed to incorporate the ‘third sector,’ civil society, as well as to involve as many branches 
of government as had a role in fighting corruption.  Although there is of course some inter-
country variation, the same broadly holds for most of the central European and Baltic 
countries; Estonia and Poland are the only exceptions. 
By contrast, in those countries where EU accession is not a near-term prospect, and political 
power is both more concentrated and less accountable, the process of introducing anti-
corruption measures has been largely ‘top down,’ based primarily on presidential decree, and 
the implementation of the supporting legislation has been delayed by legislative wrangling.  
In Azerbaijan, for example, in 1999 President Heidar Aliev issued the presidential decree “On 
Combating Corruption in the Republic of Azerbaijan,” which set out a series of goals and 
objectives to reduce corruption and instructed the Prime Minister and head of the presidential 
administration to prepare a draft anti-corruption law and a detailed action plan.  However, 
during the intervening four years little progress has been made in implementing the decree: 
the law on corruption has been drafted and has gone though one reading in parliament and the 
action plan has also been drafted, but the implementation of the latter has been postponed 
until the anti-corruption law is passed.  This pattern generally holds across those remaining 
CIS countries which have implemented omnibus anti-corruption programmes: in Kazakhstan 
and Georgia presidential decrees were used to launch omnibus strategies, while in Ukraine 
President Leonid Kuchma instructed the government to promulgate an Anti-Corruption 
Concept in 1998.  As a result, these strategies have often lacked the broad political and 
popular support necessary to lead to any detailed action plans, and have therefore rarely been 
followed by any supporting legislation or regulatory reforms.   17
4. ANTI-CORRUPTION  PROGRAMMES AND CHANGES IN 
CORRUPTION 
Is the intensity of anti-corruption programming correlated with changes in levels of 
corruption?  Looking first at bivariate correlations between the anti-corruption intensity index, 
the omnibus index, the legal framework index, and the conventions index and changes in 
administrative corruption, we found the relationship in each case to be relatively weak and 
incorrectly signed.  As Table 3 illustrates, changes in the bribe tax and time tax are significant 
and correlated with the overall intensity and conventions indices, but they are signed 
positively.  In other words, the strong positive correlation across the entire sample of 24 
transition countries means that higher levels of overall anti-corruption activity, and higher 
levels of international anti-corruption activity in particular, are associated with higher levels 
of bribe tax and time tax.  Only in the area of bribes paid to customs officials is the bivariate 
correlation both significant and signed negatively, indicating that international conventions 
and, particularly, new anti-corruption legislation have had some impact on reducing levels of 
administrative corruption in this areas. 
 
 
Turning to the bivariate correlation results on the state capture variables and anti-corruption 
programmes, we found that there is no significant correlation between the level of anti-
corruption programming in all three areas and changes in the levels of state capture, although 
more of the correlations are negatively signed (see Table 4).  Thus, it would appear from the 
Table 3: Bivariate correlations between anti-corruption programmes and 
changes in administrative corruption 








Change in Bribe Tax  0.4026*  0.2839 0.3187  0.4302** 
Change in Time Tax  0.4409**  0.3123 0.2276  0.5916*** 
Change in frequency of bribes 0.0093  0.0934  -0.1623  0.0777 
Change in bribes, public services -0.0733  -0.2627  -0.0083  0.1149 
Change in bribes, licenses  0.0621 0.1785 -0.2008  0.162 
Change in bribes, tax  0.0542 0.1695 -0.202  0.1503 
Change in bribes, customs  -0.4365**  -0.1147  -0.5732*** -0.4644** 
Change in bribes, courts  -0.0146 0.0463 -0.2033  0.1087 
Changes in kickbacks, value 0.0153  0.0405  0.03 -0.0396 
Changes in kickbacks, frequency 0.2463  0.3158  0.0431  0.2464 
* Significant at 10 per cent (2-tailed); ** significant at 5 per cent (2-tailed); *** significant at 1 per cent 
(2-tailed)   18
bivariate correlation results that adopting aggressive anti-corruption reforms – across the legal, 
international and omnibus arenas – has not been any guarantee of success in reducing levels 
of administrative corruption and state capture, and indeed has been associated with an 
increase in levels of administrative corruption in this sample of 24 transition countries. 
 
 
However, bivariate correlations do not provide any information about causality, nor do they 
control for other factors that might have contributed to reductions or increases in the level of 
corruption in the sample countries.  In order to control for these other factors that might have 
had an effect on determining outcomes in levels of corruption in this period, we then used 
multivariate regression analysis with a host of political, institutional and economic control 
variables.
19 
In order to control for individual countries’ level of political and economic development at the 
beginning of the period – on the assumption that more consolidated, democratic states with 
higher wealth per capita would have greater administrative resources to tackle corruption – 
we introduced the country’s Polity IV score in 1999, their EBRD Transition score in 1999, 
and their score on the 1998 Political Competition component of the Polyarchy index as 
controls in a multivariate regression.  We also use countries’ scores on the 1999 Freedom 
House Freedom of the Media index and the log of each country’s per capita GDP in 
US$ terms in 1999 (a detailed explanation of these variables is included in Annex 3). These 
five variables comprise the ‘initial conditions’ set of static controls. 
                                                 
19 Two-stage least squares regressions were used to control for probable recursivity in dependent and 
independent variables and for White’s heteroscedasticity. 
Table 4: Bivariate correlations between anti-corruption programmes and changes 
in state capture 
  Intensity 
Index 
Omnibus 
Index  Legal Index  Conventions Index 
Change in State Capture Index 0.0668  -0.0704 0.0076  0.2539 
Change in state capture, 
parliament  0.1312 0.0406  0.0667  0.2394 
Change in state capture, 
government  0.1185 -0.0078  0.0755  0.2514 
Change in state capture, criminal 
courts  -0.0359 -0.1741  -0.1079  0.2134 
Change in state capture, 
commercial courts  -0.0168 -0.0303  -0.1506  0.1412 
Change in state capture, central 
bank  0.1394 -0.1144  0.1839  0.3221 
Change in state capture, political 
parties  -0.0065 -0.0946  -0.0782  0.1719 
Change in frequency of bribes to 
influence legislation  0.1314 0.1439  -0.0928  0.2772 
* Significant at 10 per cent (2-tailed); ** significant at 5 per cent (2-tailed); *** significant at 1 per cent (2-
tailed)   19
In addition, we also use the dynamic components of these indices to control for the possibility 
that rapid changes (whether improvements or worsening) in the areas of institutional 
democracy, political competition, media freedom or economic growth might have a 
significant impact on levels of reported corruption in these countries.
20  Thus, we use the 
change in these four indicators’ scores over the same 1999-2002 period for which we have 
data from the BEEPS, and for which we have constructed the anti-corruption indices. 
Introducing these controls in multivariate regression analysis significantly changes the overall 
picture of the relationship between anti-corruption programmes and changes in levels of 
administrative corruption. It also confirms the relationship between anti-corruption 
programmes and changes in state capture in the transition countries.  Looking first at 
administrative corruption, as Table 5 illustrates, undertaking intensive anti-corruption reforms 
in the legal area has a significant and negative effect on the frequency of bribes and kickbacks, 
as well as on countries’ levels of bribes in the areas of licenses, taxes, customs and the courts.  
However, none of the three forms of anti-corruption programming has a significant effect on 
our ‘headline’ measures of administrative corruption: the bribe tax and the time tax.   
Moreover, neither participation in international anti-corruption campaigns nor the widely 
publicised omnibus anti-corruption programmes have had a significant effect on reducing 
administrative corruption in any of these ten dimensions assessed by the BEEPS.
21 
Turning once again to changes in the level of state capture, even when introducing a causal 
direction in the regression equation and controlling for both initial conditions and changes in 
the 1999-2002 period, the lack of correlation between intensive anti-corruption programmes 
and levels of state capture reported in Table 4 remain true.  As Table 6 shows, when 
controlling for other potential institutional, political and economic influences on the levels of 
state capture, the effects of our indices of anti-corruption activity are not significant in 
reducing levels of state capture.  Only the level of per capita GDP in 1999 and the level of 
political competition in 1998 had a significant effect on capture variables – the level of 
capture of political parties and government, respectively – and these variables were only 
significant at the 10 per cent level.  Moreover, per capita GDP is positively signed, meaning 
that higher levels of per capita wealth in 1999 are associated with higher levels of capture of 
political parties in the 1999-2002 period. 
Thus, while the introduction or amendment of legislation aimed at reducing levels of 
corruption has had a significant impact on reducing certain forms of administrative corruption, 
omnibus anti-corruption programmes and international commitments on anti-corruption have 
had no effect on administrative reform. In addition, none of our three measures of anti-
corruption activity have had a significant effect on state capture in the 1999-2002 period.  In 
                                                 
20 The Polyarchy database, which includes the competition variable, terminates in 1998.  Hence, we 
cannot use the change in this variable for the 1998-2002 period.  However, the nature of this variable 
indicates that it is unlikely to change significantly over a short time period anyway.  See Annex 3 for 
details. 
21  These relationships hold whether we include all three anti-corruption indices as simultaneous 
independent variables to control for multicollinearity, whether we use control variables, or whether we 
introduce the static and dynamic control variables separately.  Results are available from the authors.   20
sum, as the bivariate correlations have also shown, undertaking high profile anti-corruption 
activities is no guarantee that actual levels of corruption will be reduced in the short term.  For 
an illustration using one country’s experience of the apparent ineffectiveness of anti-
corruption programmes, see Annex 1. 
In the section that follows the tables, we examine the effects of omnibus, legal and 
international anti-corruption programmes on the perception of corruption problems in the 
transition countries.   21
 
































Omnibus 0.028  -0.567  0.075  -0.300  0.267 0.132  0.242  0.107 -0.088 0.398 
   0.04  0.27 0.18  1.05 0.87  0.42 0.66  0.52  0.07  1.25 
Legal -0.894  -1.672  -1.527** -0.700  -1.549***  -1.537**  -1.554**  -1.780*** 4.414  -1.735** 
   0.49 0.43  2.6 1.63  3.31  2.55  2.52  3.73 1.33 2.57 
Conventions 0.261  8.979  -0.934  0.087  0.195 0.829  -0.352  -0.341  -1.292  -0.208 
   0.13  1.49 1.07  0.12 0.26  0.99 0.33  0.4  0.35  0.21 
Polity, 1999  -3.389  -2.654  -0.048  -1.041*  -1.534** -1.064  -0.811 -1.026  2.744  -0.895 
   1.4 0.55 0.05  1.88  2.66 1.25  0.66  1.59 0.74 1.09 
Transition, 1999  -10.025* -13.565  -5.383*** -1.356 -2.653  -1.947 -0.564 -2.374  -7.945  -1.734 
   2.16 0.85  3.11 1.02  1.38  0.93  0.28 1.23  0.7  0.66 
Competition, 1998  -1.715  -5.358  -0.691 -0.230  0.298  0.125  0.863 0.343  -1.960  0.245 
   0.64 0.7  0.81  0.27 0.39  0.12 0.95  0.51  0.57  0.38 
Media Freedom, 1999  13.812  10.808  7.083** 3.176 4.759  3.498  2.586 5.543  -5.164  5.054 
   1.76 0.54  2.25 1.32  1.63  1.33  0.7 1.55 0.41 1.29 
Ln GDP per capita US$, 1999  -1.392  -0.648 -0.758  -0.227 -0.504  -0.914*  -1.154* -0.543  2.231  -0.633 
   0.84 0.2  1.35  0.49 1.09  2.01  1.86 0.98  0.91  1.13 
Change in Polity, 1999-2002  6.898  9.140  3.252 3.379  2.621  1.101  0.652 0.682  3.528  -0.328 
   1.39  0.66 1.45  1.59 1.29  0.48 0.25  0.34  0.5  0.17 
Change in Transition, 1999-2002  -27.402* -16.899  -13.801** -6.669  -7.577  -9.783* -8.262  -7.407  -5.589  -5.519 
   1.91 0.38  2.41 1.52  1.65  1.84 1.18  1.3  0.25  0.93 
Change in Media Freedom, 1999-2002 9.234 8.539  4.234  0.225 2.537  2.376  2.735 5.026* -3.726  4.094 
   1.12 0.49  1.74  0.14 1.27  1.16  1.08 2.18 0.26  1.3 
Change in ln GDP pc, 1999-2002  1.385** 1.150  0.665**  0.450*  0.477**  0.546** 0.297  0.192 -0.059 0.302 
   2.54 0.67  2.66  1.97  2.5  2.22 1.1  0.93  0.08  1.38 
Constant 2.806  3.690  2.302 0.154  1.440  2.651**  3.926** 1.799  -4.483  1.695 
   0.64  0.44 1.64  0.13 1.26  2.3 2.56 1.19  0.69  1.12 
Observations  24  24 24  24 24  24  24 24  24  24 
R-squared 0.59  0.62  0.53 0.53  0.60  0.58  0.67 0.64  0.39  0.57 
Robust t statistics in bold italics 
* significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent.   22























Change in freq. of 
bribes to influence 
legislation 
Omnibus -0.085  -0.062  -0.111  -0.099 -0.034  -0.142  -0.046 0.016 
   0.69 0.36 0.69  0.89  0.23 0.93  0.48  0.13 
Legal -0.077  -0.031  0.015  -0.250 -0.139  0.086  -0.098 -0.650 
   0.25 0.08 0.04  0.99 0.46  0.26  0.3  1.65 
Conventions 0.251  0.170  0.309 0.100  0.124  0.323 0.507  0.748 
   0.61 0.31 0.51  0.29  0.29 0.79  1.29  1.2 
Polity, 1999  0.305  0.255  0.324  0.368 0.287  0.078  0.440 -0.747 
   0.77 0.51 0.65  1.1  0.71 0.18  1.17  1.53 
Transition, 1999  -0.427  -0.627  -0.375 -0.786  -0.880  -0.559 0.659  -0.445 
   0.49 0.56 0.28  1.01  0.89 0.61  0.73  0.32 
Competition, 1998 -0.491  -0.655  -0.718* -0.372  -0.237  -0.388 -0.586  -0.109 
   1.44 1.56 1.93 1.28  0.71  0.85 1.53  0.21 
Media Freedom, 1999  0.276  0.729  0.387 0.666  0.475  0.477 -1.104  1.891 
   0.2 0.36  0.16 0.57  0.31 0.41  0.95  0.72 
Ln GDP per capita US$, 1999 0.142  0.049  0.022  0.158 0.087  0.189  0.342* -0.492 
   0.77 0.16 0.08  1.01 0.4  1.04  1.8 1.18 
Change in Polity, 1999-2002  -0.529  -0.307 -0.335  -0.311  -0.343 -0.636  -1.150  0.036 
   0.66 0.26  0.3  0.45  0.38 0.7  1.52 0.03 
Change in Transition, 1999-2002  0.049  -0.501 -0.009  -1.024  -1.211 0.210  2.628  -1.787 
   0.02 0.15  0  0.5  0.46 0.08  1.13  0.42 
Change in Media Freedom, 1999-02  0.381 0.996 0.509  0.583  0.577 0.200  -0.674  1.097 
   0.33 0.66 0.29  0.61  0.47 0.18  0.61  0.59 
Change in ln GDP pc, 1999-2002  -0.133  -0.129 -0.110  -0.111  -0.101 -0.158  -0.175  0.098 
   1.39 0.97  0.9  1.38  1.02 1.39  1.75  0.64 
Constant -0.182  0.070  0.113  -0.153 0.139  -0.386  -0.863 1.571 
   0.34 0.09 0.14  0.34  0.22 0.82  1.63  1.37 
Observations  24  24  24 24  24  24 24  24 
R-squared 0.55  0.47  0.44  0.62 0.44  0.59  0.60 0.52 
Robust t statistics in bold italics 
* significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent.   23
5. ANTI-CORRUPTION  PROGRAMMES AND CHANGES IN 
PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION 
Corruption is inherently difficult to measure, and for understandable reasons: people who 
engage in corrupt activities, whether as bribe suppliers or bribe takers, are reluctant to admit 
that they do so.  Those who try to measure quantitatively the level of corruption in a given 
country therefore rely heavily on the perception of corruption among various social groups – 
households, government officials, foreign and/or domestic businesses, or experts.   
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), for example, measures a 
combination of expert and business perceptions of how corrupt public officials and 
businessmen are, rather than, for example, how much corruption costs in either real terms or 
in terms of the impact that corruption has on growth.
22 
The question of what generates changes in perceptions of corruption, however, is complex.  
Anti-corruption programmes could be expected to play a role in the public’s perception of 
corruption, but in what way is unclear.
23   On the one hand, we might expect that the 
perception of corruption as an obstacle to the normal functioning of social and economic life 
would decline as the intensity of anti-corruption programming increases, since this would 
increase managers’ optimism that something is being done to combat corruption.  On the 
other hand, higher profile anti-corruption programmes may only serve to draw attention to the 
severity of the problem, driving perceptions in the opposite direction. 
As outlined above, the BEEPS includes several questions that relate to the perception of 
corruption.  We focus here on two questions which ask firms to score and rank a number of 
potential obstacles, including corruption, to the operation and growth of their businesses.  We 
examine both the change in the absolute scores on the ‘corruption as obstacle’ question, as 
well as the change in the rank of corruption among the 21 different potential obstacles, which 
include issues such as access to finance, infrastructure, policy uncertainty, crime and a host of 
other potential obstacles. 
We find that across the whole sample of transition countries there is a relatively strong, 
significant positive correlation between anti-corruption activities and perceptions of 
corruption (see Table 7).  The composite intensity index, the legal index and the conventions 
index are significantly and positively correlated with the scoring of corruption as an obstacle 
to the operation and growth of businesses. In other words, an increase in the overall intensity 
of anti-corruption programmes seems to heighten firms’ perception of corruption as an 
obstacle to the operation and growth of their businesses. 
 
                                                 
22 One attempt to quantify the effects of corruption, by estimating the cost of corruption to national 
economies, is the Price Waterhouse Cooper “Opacity Index,” which nevertheless uses data from a 
survey of business leaders about their perceptions of corruption in their country to reach conclusions 
about the economic costs and risk premium attributed to corrupt officials.  
23 For a discussion of the various factors that may influence perceptions of corruption, see World Bank 
(2003).   24
 
Of all three types of anti-corruption programmes analysed here, we would expect that the high 
profile omnibus programmes would have the greatest effect on firm perceptions.  Omnibus 
programmes are the most visible signal of how much a government has done to spotlight anti-
corruption initiatives as a government priority, through the creation of special institutions or 
action plans for fighting corruption.  However, omnibus programmes tell us less about 
specific initiatives to deal with key components of either administrative or grand corruption.  
The putative purpose behind these more high profile policy instruments is to bring down the 
level of corruption while signalling to domestic and international audiences that the 
government is getting tough on corruption. 
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Table 7: Bivariate correlations between anti-corruption programmes and 












Change in corruption as an obstacle  0.4853**  0.2594  0.3986*  0.6002** 
Change in rank of corruption as an 
obstacle  -0.0798  -0.3708*  0.2706  -0.0572 
* Significant at 10 per cent (2-tailed); ** significant at 5 per cent (2-tailed); *** significant at 1per cent 
(2-tailed)   25
Despite the lack of a statistically significant correlation, there is a clear effect of omnibus anti-
corruption programmes on firms’ perceptions of the importance of corruption as an obstacle 
to their operation and growth.  This relationship is illustrated graphically in Chart 3, which 
shows that the decline in the perception of corruption as an obstacle to firms’ operation and 
growth has been greatest in the lowest quartile of countries ranked according to the omnibus 
index, while it has declined least in the top quartile of countries on this index.  In other words, 
high-profile omnibus anti-corruption programmes do not appear to reduce perceptions of 
corruption as an obstacle to business.  Instead, they appear to raise them. 
We find a similar story when we look at the change in the rank of corruption (as opposed to 
the absolute score) as an obstacle to the operation and growth of business.  In this relative 
ranking, the signs in the bivariate correlation remain consistent (except for the legal index), 
but the significance of the results is reversed.  Of the three independent indicators of anti-
corruption activity, only omnibus anti-corruption programming is significantly correlated with 
changes in firms’ ranking of corruption as an obstacle to the operation and growth of their 
businesses.  Once again, however, the correlation coefficient is negatively signed, meaning 
that higher levels of omnibus anti-corruption activity are correlated with corruption being 
ranked as a relatively more important obstacle to firms’ operation and growth.
24  Thus, as 
Chart 4 illustrates, the highest omnibus anti-corruption countries score very low in terms of 
the change in corruption’s place in the rank order of obstacles to business: indeed, on average 
across the biggest omnibus reformers, corruption has fallen only slightly more than one-half 
of a rank place.  In the low omnibus countries, by contrast, corruption has fallen on average 
two-and-a-half rank places. 









First quartile Second quartile Third quartile Fourth quartile
Firms ranked according to omnibus index
 
                                                 
24 The correlation coefficients on change in the rank of corruption as an obstacle are negatively signed, 
indicating that anti-corruption activity in these three arenas is associated with corruption being ranked 
as a more important obstacle to the operation and growth of business over the 1999-2002 period 
(going down the rank of importance entails an increase (positive) in the rank place number).   26
Turning to the multivariate regression results reported in Table 8, when we introduce controls 
for other factors that might influence firms’ perceptions of the level of administrative 
corruption, the impact of anti-corruption programmes drops out.  Only the level of the 
development of democratic institutions (Polity) in 1999 has a significant effect on the change 
in the score of corruption as an obstacle to the operation and growth of firms, and that is itself 
positively signed.  In other words, in countries with higher levels of institutional democracy in 
1999, firms’ perceptions of the problems posed by corruption actually increased over the 
1999-2002 period more than it did in countries with relatively weaker democratic institutions 
in 1999. 
Why do increases in the overall intensity of anti-corruption programmes, and in particular the 
implementation of omnibus programmes, increase the perception of corruption as a problem?  
One answer may be that omnibus programmes in particular tend to raise the profile and 
visibility of corruption, without necessarily providing any immediate or ‘deep’ changes in the 
levels of corruption within a country.  An alternative, and possibly complementary, 
explanation is that omnibus anti-corruption programmes in general are perceived as less 
effective than other forms of anti-corruption work that governments might undertake.  The 
evidence presented here suggests that highlighting corruption in this fashion may have made 
firms more aware of the problem of corruption, without necessarily convincing managers that 
the government’s omnibus programmes are producing any tangible reductions in the obstacles 
that corruption poses. 
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Table 8: Multivariate regression results: anti-corruption programmes and 





Change in rank of 
corruption as 
obstacle 
Omnibus -0.321  -2.609 
   1.4 1.59 
Legal 0.464  3.834 
   1.16 1.03 
Conventions 0.421  -2.074 
   0.88 0.47 
Polity, 1999  1.486** -4.345 
   2.66 0.95 
Transition, 1999  -2.408  2.896 
   1.51 0.2 
Competition, 1998 -0.247  -0.568 
   0.44 0.13 
Media Freedom, 1999  -1.103  6.137 
   0.6 0.41 
Ln GDP per capita US$, 1999  0.345  0.537 
   0.95 0.17 
Change in Polity, 1999-2002  -1.303  1.137 
   1.01 0.1 
Change in Transition, 1999-2002  -2.464  7.775 
   0.66 0.27 
Change in Media Freedom, 1999-
2002 1.191  -0.158 
   0.8 0.01 
Change in ln GDP pc, 1999-2002  0.041  -0.345 
   0.26 0.2 
Constant -0.930  -1.561 
   1.03 0.19 
Observations 24  24 
R-squared 0.74  0.53 
Robust t statistics in bold italics 
* significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1per cent   28
6.  SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This paper has formulated a new way of measuring the intensity of anti-corruption activity 
and conducted a range of preliminary tests to assess the short-term impact of anti-corruption 
programmes in reducing levels of both administrative and grand corruption as well as 
perceptions of corruption as an obstacle to business in the transition countries in the period 
1999-2002.  We find that transition countries with low levels of administrative corruption 
have been more likely to adopt intensive anti-corruption programmes than countries with high 
levels of administrative corruption.  This confirms previous research which showed that anti-
corruption measures tend to be adopted where they are needed least: in countries which do not 
have particularly serious corruption problems.  However, we also found that countries with 
high levels of state capture are almost as likely to adopt anti-corruption programmes as low 
capture countries. 
Our findings from both bivariate and multivariate analysis then showed that omnibus anti-
corruption activity and membership in international anti-corruption conventions have not 
resulted in reductions in the level of administrative corruption.  In fact, the results of the 
bivariate correlations showed that the international conventions index and the overall intensity 
index are correlated significantly and positively with changes in the bribe tax and time tax.  
This indicates that countries which have undertaken more intense work in these areas have 
actually experienced an increase in reported levels of administrative corruption.  However, 
not all anti-corruption activities aimed at eradicating administrative corruption in the 
transition countries in this period were fruitless.  We found that new anti-corruption 
legislation aimed at reducing the opportunities for rent-seeking in areas such as financial 
transactions and political party finance are correlated with lower levels of some forms of 
administrative corruption. 
The findings presented in the paper also suggest that omnibus and legal anti-corruption 
programmes and membership in international anti-corruption conventions are not linked to 
reductions in state capture.  This relationship holds for both bivariate correlations and 
multivariate regressions with a host of political, economic and institutional controls.   
However, this lack of a causal relationship between anti-corruption programmes and state 
capture does not arise because state capture has been more resistant to change in the 1999-
2002 period.  State capture, as measured by the BEEPS, has declined as significantly in this 
period as has administrative corruption.  However, neither anti-corruption programmes nor 
the other institutional, political, or economic variables surveyed in this paper seem to have 
brought about the observed reduction in levels of capture across the region. 
It is important to reiterate that these initial conclusions are based on only two surveys 
covering a relatively short time period, and so must remain preliminary.  A great deal more 
empirical work must be conducted on the effectiveness of various types of anti-corruption 
programmes before reaching firmer conclusions.  Still, some tentative policy implications can 
be drawn from the preceding analysis. 
First, the evidence presented above indicates that of the three types of anti-corruption 
programmes assessed in the paper, omnibus initiatives and adherence to international 
conventions may be of less importance than the implementation of specific legislative reforms 
for reducing the incidence and perception of corruption by businesses.  This adds further 
impetus to the importance of drafting and implementing effective laws regulating the civil 
service, public procurement, financial disclosure, money laundering, and political party 
financing and promoting freedom of information.   29
Second, the evidence analysed in the paper indicates that signing international covenants and 
joining anti-corruption related transnational organisations is unlikely to have a direct, near-
term impact on levels and perceptions of corruption.  However, the indirect effect of 
participation in these bodies, particularly for a country’s reputation in the international 
community and among foreign investors (whose views are not surveyed in the BEEPS) could 
still be significant.  One way to increase the potency of international organisations in reducing 
actual levels of corruption would be to better coordinate the existing analytical work to 
diagnose corruption problems, as well as commissioning new surveys, and to build in stronger 
incentives for governments to comply with the anti-corruption principles on which such 
organisations are founded. 
Finally, if further research confirms that high profile omnibus programmes are not 
particularly effective in reducing levels of administrative corruption and state capture, 
bilateral and multilateral donors will need to adjust their lending strategies and policy advice 
accordingly.  Where anti-corruption programmes are applied from the top-down, without 
adequate transparency and sufficient participation of civil society groups in both the 
formulation and monitoring of the initiatives, they may be a smokescreen for inaction rather 
than a sincere attempt to reduce levels of corruption.   30
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ANNEX 1:  ANTI-CORRUPTION PROGRAMMES AND CHANGES IN 
THE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT IN ALBANIA, RUSSIA AND 
ARMENIA 
There are a number of cases, particularly in south-eastern Europe, where governments have 
pursued intensive anti-corruption programmes in the past several years but administrative 
corruption and state capture levels as reported by in the BEEPS have remained unchanged or 
even increased.  Albania is a strong case in point, and below we look in more detail at this 
country’s experience.  At the same time, there is a relatively large group of countries that, 
according to the BEEPS, have made substantial progress in reducing both actual and 
perceived levels of corruption without developing omnibus anti-corruption policies.  Armenia, 
Belarus, Estonia, FYR Macedonia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Poland, Russia, and Uzbekistan 
have not developed any of the three major components of omnibus anti-corruption strategies.  
However, of these Armenia, Estonia and Russia were successful in reducing levels of both 
administrative corruption and state capture between 1999 and 2002, while Uzbekistan and 
FYR Macedonia were successful in bringing down levels of administrative corruption 
(although levels of state capture increased over this period).  It is therefore useful to look in 
more detail at what has, and what has not, been done in these countries to reduce 




The Albanian government has implemented numerous anti-corruption programmes since 
1999, but levels of both administrative and grand corruption rose between 1999 and 2002.  In 
the 1999 BEEPS, Albania was rated as a low capture, high administrative corruption country.  
As Table 2 in the main text illustrates, Albania has been among the highest intensity countries 
in terms of its overall anti-corruption strategy, surpassed on the intensity index by only 
Lithuania and the Slovak Republic.  Albania has been extremely active on the omnibus anti-
corruption front, as well as in signing up to international anti-corruption conventions and 
participating actively in international anti-corruption initiatives.  In terms of legal reform, 
Albania ranks among the ‘second tier’ countries in terms of the amount and quality of 
substantive anti-corruption legislation it has adopted since 1999. 
In April 2000, after numerous revisions and inputs from the World Bank, Council of Europe 
and European Commission, an anti-corruption plan was adopted which addressed institutional 
reform, including civil service reform; the strengthening of legislation and consolidation of 
the rule of law; reform of public finance management; the promotion of transparency and 
integrity in business transactions; and the development of an effective public information 
framework.  In substance this plan emphasised heavily public administration reform, the 
drafting of new legislation and the filling of gaps in the legal framework.  In addition, the 
government in 1999 set up the Anti-Corruption Monitoring Group (ACMG) in the Office of 
the Minister of State. The task of the ACMG (which consists of high ranking civil servants 
from different governmental institutions and independent state bodies) is to ensure the 
implementation of the anti-corruption plan through monitoring and advice. 
In addition, Albania has passed legislation in a number of crucial anti-corruption areas.  In 
1999 the government adopted a new civil service law, which greatly increased the 
opportunities for corruption within the public services.  In 2000 the government also amended 
Albania’s public procurement legislation, the laws “On Public Procurement” and “On the 
Rules of Public Procurement”.  The government passed a new freedom of information law in   33
1999 and in 2000 passed a new political party finance law that  prohibits any kind of financial 
support to political parties from the business community.  Furthermore, article 9 of the 1998 
Constitution requires parties to declare their sources of financing. 
Finally, Albania has been extremely active on the international anti-corruption front: Albania 
is an active member of both the Stability Pact Anti-Corruption Initiative (SPAI) and the 
Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO); it has signed and ratified 
all of the Council of Europe’s Conventions on corruption: the criminal and civil law 
conventions on corruption and the convention on laundering, search, seizure and confiscation 
of the proceeds of crime. 
However, despite this extremely high level of activity across virtually all areas of possible 
anti-corruption programming, Albania is the only country in which both state capture and 
administrative corruption have increased in the 1999-2002 period. Moreover, the frequency of 
bribes also increased in Albania in this period.   
 
Russia 
According to the 1999 BEEPS, Russia was ranked as a high capture country with mid-range 
levels of administrative corruption.  By 2002, the level of both state capture and 
administrative corruption had come down, significantly in the case of state capture.  At the 
same time, Russia has undertaken very little in the way of high profile anti-corruption 
programmes, but has implemented a series of quite important reforms which, policymakers 
claim, were part of a more implicit corruption fighting agenda.  This includes legal reform to 
improve the fairness and effectiveness of the judiciary and court system, reform of the 
political party system and public sector management (especially tax reform), and reform to 
increase competitiveness of the private sector (de-bureaucratisation laws, breaking up natural 
monopolies, corporate governance code, joint stock company law). 
Moreover, since Vladimir Putin came to office in 2000, there have been significant changes in 
the relationship between big business and the state, which under the previous administration 
were seen as fuelling the problem of state capture by vested interests.  These reforms have 
been accompanied by some aggressive and very public steps by the Audit Chamber to 
investigate corrupt practices at the highest level of government.  The Russian case would 
seem to offer evidence that tackling corruption can be done effectively without resorting to 
the creation of new anti-corruption bodies and formulating specific anti-corruption laws. 
Although implementation of some of these measures remains incomplete, there is both direct 
evidence (from tax receipts) and indirect evidence (from monitoring surveys) that tax and de-
bureaucratisation reforms have been effective thus far.
25   Also, a multi-pronged approach 
even without a devoted anti-corruption commission has been effective in changing public 
perceptions of corruption – both the absolute rating and the ranking of corruption as an 
obstacle to business has come down among Russian firms according to the BEEPS, and 
Russia’s ranking and overall score according to the TI Corruption Perceptions Index 
improved for the past two years. 
Of course, corruption remains a serious problem in Russia, as both the TI rating and Russian 
corruption surveys illustrate, but, even in the absence of high profile omnibus anti-corruption 
programmes, the authorities’ multi-pronged efforts to strengthen institutions of governance 
                                                 
25 On monitoring surveys, see the Centre for Economic and Financial Research work on Monitoring 
Administrative Barriers to Small Business Development in Russia (www.cefir.ru).   34





According to the 1999 BEEPS, Armenia had a serious problem with administrative corruption 
but was ranked as a low capture country.  Like Russia, Armenia achieved significant 
reductions in corruption in the 1999-2002 period, according to the BEEPS, without the benefit 
of omnibus anti-corruption initiatives. 
Armenia has received assistance from the World Bank to formulate an anti-corruption 
strategy, and several donors and international organisations have joined with government 
officials to get a strategy approved and adopted, but with little success.  Numerous surveys by 
the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Foreign Investors Advisory 
Service (FIAS), Transparency International and others supplied Armenian officials with 
extensive information on the business climate, administrative barriers, and corruption.   
Since that time, the Armenian authorities have failed to agree on and implement a national 
anti-corruption strategy but have adopted a public administration reform law in 2001, a 
financial disclosure law, and a law on licensing that reduces the scope for bureaucratic 
interventions and bribe-seeking.  Both perceptions of corruption and reported absolute values 
of bribes and time spent dealing with regulators have come down over the past three years.  In 
fact, Armenia saw the largest reduction in the bribe tax among the 27 countries surveyed in 
the 2002 BEEPS.  Surveys by the World Bank in 2002 also report improvements in the 
business climate.  There is more to be done to improve the business climate and reduce 
administrative corruption in Armenia, which experts continue to describe as “rampant” and 
“widespread.”  Strengthening rule of law is a particularly important area of reform.  However, 
the evidence available in the BEEPS suggests that the problem of administrative corruption is 
becoming less severe, and this progress has been achieved in the absence of a national anti-
corruption strategy. 
                                                 
26 See Satarov (2002).  According to the results of this survey, the problem of state capture is turned on 
its head: firms are no longer the main protagonists in capturing the state, but rather the state and its 
extensive bureaucracy are seen to be capturing private business.   35
ANNEX 2: ANTI-CORRUPTION MATRIX 
 










branch Adopted NGOs 
Multi-
branch Estd NGOs 
Multi-
branch Indep 
Albania  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  
Armenia                     
Azerbaijan  √              
Belarus                     
Bosnia & Herz.  √              
Bulgaria  √  √  √  √  √  √         
Croatia  √  √  √  √  √  √  √   √  
Czech Rep.  √    √        √       
Estonia                 
FYR 
Macedonia                     
Georgia  √   √      √      
Hungary  √  √  √               
Kazakhstan  √              
Kyrgyz Rep.                      
Latvia  √  √  √  √  √  √        
Lithuania  √  √  √  √  √  √  √    √  √ 
Moldova  √   √    √  √  √  
Poland                     
Romania  √  √  √  √  √  √  √      
Russia                     
Slovak Rep.  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Slovenia              √    √   
Tajikistan                 
Turkmenistan                     
Ukraine  √   √  √   √        
Uzbekistan                     
Montenegro       √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Serbia  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √    √ 
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Albania  √   √  √  √  √ 
Armenia  √  √      √   
Azerbaijan  √   √  √    
Belarus             
Bosnia & Herz.       √  √* 
Bulgaria  √  √  √  √     
Croatia  √  √  √  √    
Czech Rep.    √  √  √  √   
Estonia  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
FYR Macedonia  √          √ 
Georgia     √  √    
Hungary    √  √  √  √  √ 
Kazakhstan  √        
Kyrgyz Rep.   √    √       
Latvia  √  √  √  √  √  
Lithuania  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Moldova    √   √  √ 
Poland  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Romania  √   √  √  √ 
Russia    √        √ 
Slovak Rep.  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Slovenia  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Tajikistan    √        
Turkmenistan             
Ukraine    √    √  
Uzbekistan      √       
Montenegro          
Serbia  √    √       
* This variable was scored 0.5 as the Federation has adopted anti-money laundering legislation, but 
Republika Srpska has not 
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  Conventions Index 



























Albania  √   √  √  √  √* 
Armenia  na      √**     
Azerbaijan  na    √**    
Belarus  na        √**   
Bosnia & Herz.  √   √   √  √* 
Bulgaria    √  √  √  √  √* 
Croatia  √   √  √  √  √** 
Czech Rep.  na  √  √  √  √  √** 
Estonia  na  √  √  √  √* 
FYR 
Macedonia  √    √  √  √  √* 
Georgia  na  √  √**  √**  √** 
Hungary  na  √  √  √  √  √** 
Kazakhstan  na         
Kyrgyz Rep.   na           
Latvia  na  √  √  √  
Lithuania  na    √  √  √  √* 
Moldova  √   √  √  √**  √** 
Poland  na  √  √  √  √  √* 
Romania  √   √  √  √  √* 
Russia  na      √  √**   
Slovak Rep.  na  √  √  √  √  √** 
Slovenia  na  √  √  √  √  √** 
Tajikistan  na         
Turkmenistan  na           
Ukraine  na    √  √**  √** 
Uzbekistan  na           
Serbia & Mont.  √      √  
* These variables were scored 0.66 as the covenant has been signed and ratified, but has not yet 
entered into force. 
** This variable was score 0.33 as the covenant has been signed but not ratified. 
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ANNEX 3: VARIABLES DEFINITIONS 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES  
  
Administrative Corruption   
Change in bribe tax  Change from 1999-2002 in the country average of the 
percentage of firms’ annual sales paid in unofficial payments or 
gifts to public officials. 
Change in time tax  Change from 1999-2002 in the country average of the 
percentage of firms’ senior management’s time spent in 
dealing with public officials about the application and 
interpretation of laws and regulations and to get or to maintain 
access to public services. 
Change in frequency of bribes  Change from 1999-2002 in the country average of the 
frequency of firms’ payments of additional payments or gifts to 
get things done with regard to customs, taxes, licences, 
regulations, services, etc. 
Change in bribes, public services  Change from 1999-2002 in the country average of the 
frequency of firms’ payments of unofficial payments or gifts to 
get connected to and maintain public services (electricity and 
telephone). 
Change in bribes, licences  Change from 1999-2002 in the country average of the 
frequency of firms’ payments of unofficial payments or gifts to 
obtain business licences and permits. 
Change in bribes, tax  Change from 1999-2002 in the country average of the 
frequency of firms’ payments of unofficial payments or gifts to 
deal with taxes and tax collection. 
Change in bribes, customs  Change from 1999-2002 in the country average of the 
frequency of firms’ payments of unofficial payments or gifts to 
deal with customs/imports. 
Change in bribes, courts  Change from 1999-2002 in the country average of the 
frequency of firms’ payments of unofficial payments or gifts to 
deal with courts. 
Change in kickbacks, value  Change from 1999-2002 in the country average of the 
percentage of the contract value paid in additional or unofficial 
payments or gifts by firms to secure the typical government 
contract. 
Change in kickbacks, frequency  Change from 1999-2002 in the country average of the 
frequency of firms’ payments of unofficial payments or gifts to 
secure government contracts.   39
 
State Capture   
Change in capture index  Change from 1999-2002 in the unweighted average of 
the six component indicators of capture (parliament, 
government, criminal courts, commercial courts, central 
bank, political parties). 
Change in capture, parliament  Change from 1999-2002 in the country average of the 
impact on firms of the payment of unofficial or private 
payments or gifts to parliamentarians to affect their 
votes. 
Change in capture, government  Change from 1999-2002 in the country average of the 
impact on firms of the payment of unofficial or private 
payments or gifts to government officials to affect the 
content of government decrees. 
Change in capture, criminal courts  Change from 1999-2002 in the country average of the 
impact on firms of the payment of unofficial or private 
payments or gifts to judges to affect the decisions of 
criminal court cases. 
Change in capture, commercial courts  Change from 1999-2002 in the country average of the 
impact on firms of the payment of unofficial or private 
payments or gifts to judges to affect the decisions in 
commercial courts. 
Change in capture, central bank  Change from 1999-2002 in the country average of the 
impact on firms of the payment of unofficial or private 
payments or gifts to central bank officials to affect 
central bank policies and decisions. 
Change in capture, political parties  Change from 1999-2002 in the country average of the 
impact on firms of the illegal payment of unofficial or 
private payments or gifts to political parties and/or 
election campaigns to affect the decisions of elected 
officials. 
Change in frequency of bribes to influence 
legislature 
Change from 1999-2002 in the country average of the 
frequency of firms’ payments of unofficial payments or 
gifts to influence legislature. 
Perception of Corruption   
Change in corruption as obstacle  Change from 1999-2002 in the country average of the 
score of corruption as an obstacle to firms’ operation 
and growth. 
Change in rank of corruption as obstacle  Change from 1999-2002 in the country average of the 
rank of corruption as an obstacle to firms’ operation and 
growth, out of 21 potential obstacles.    40
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES  
  
Polity, 1999  Countries’ 1999 score on the Polity IV index.  This comprises 
two components: a democracy score and an autocracy 
score.  The democracy score is made up of a weighted 
average of scores on: openness of executive recruitment; 
competitiveness of executive recruitment; constraints on the 
chief executive; and competitiveness of political participation.  
The democracy score is made up of a weighted average of: 
competitiveness of executive recruitment; openness of 
competitive recruitment; constraints on chief executive; the 
regulation of participation; and competitiveness of 
participation.  The Polity score is computed by subtracting 
the autocracy score from the democracy score.  Data are 
available for the period 1818-2002.  Rescaled to 0-1 scale. 
Transition, 1999  Countries’ 1999  EBRD Transition Indicator score.  The 
unweighted average of the EBRD’s nine Transition 
Indicators, which include scores for large-scale privatisation, 
small-scale privatisation, governance and enterprise 
restructuring, price liberalisation, trade and forex 
liberalisation, competition policy, banking reform and interest 
rate liberalisation, securities markets and non-bank financial 
institutions, and infrastructure.  Rescaled to 0-1 scale. 
Competition, 1998  Countries’ 1998 score on the Vanhanen Polyarchy index.  
Competition component is a proxy for political competition 
within the electorate.  This variable uses electoral turnout 
(the proportion of the voting age population which vote) as 
the proxy.  The data are available 1950-1988.  Rescaled to 
0-1 scale. 
Media Freedom, 1999  Countries’ 1999 score on the Freedom House Freedom of 
the Media index.  Subjective scoring of freedom of the media, 
based on surveys of country and regional specialists.  
Rescaled to 0-1 scale. 
Ln GDP US$, 1999  Natural log of per capita GDP in US$ in 1999.  Source: 
EBRD. 
Change in Polity, 1999-2002  Change from 1999-2002 in countries’ Polity scores.  A 
positive score indicates more democracy. 
Change in Transition, 1999-2002  Change from 1999-2002 in countries’ transition scores.  A 
positive score indicates more progress in transition. 
Change in Media Freedom, 1999-
2002 
Change from 1999-2002 in countries’ Media Freedom 
scores.  A positive score indicates higher levels of media 
freedom. 
Change in ln GDP pc, 1999-2002  Change from 1999-2002 in countries’ per capita GDP (nat. 
log).  A positive score indicates higher p.c. GDP. 
 